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Chapter 6 
Chinese foreign direct investment in central and eastern 
Europe: an institutional perspective
Agnieszka McCaleb and Ágnes Szunomár
1. Introduction
Emerging-country multinational companies are increasingly integrating into the world 
economy through foreign direct investment (FDI), with Chinese outward FDI being the 
most spectacular case in terms of rapid growth, geographical diversity and takeovers 
of established Western brands. Chinese firms invest mainly in Asia, Latin America 
and Africa, where they seek markets and natural resources. However, the developed 
economies of Western Europe and the United States have recently also become 
important targets, offering markets for Chinese products and assets Chinese firms lack, 
such as advanced technologies, managerial knowledge and distribution networks.
In recent years Chinese companies have increasingly targeted central and eastern 
European countries, with the Visegrad countries (Czechia, Hungary, Poland and 
Slovakia), together with Romania and Bulgaria, among the most popular destinations.1 
Although compared with the Chinese economic presence globally or even in the 
developed world, China’s economic impact on the central and eastern European 
countries is fairly small it has accelerated significantly in the past decade: trade volume 
is growing constantly, while we can observe rising inflows of Chinese investments 
in the region, which are expected to increase due to recent political developments: 
strengthening Chinese–Hungarian relations, Poland becoming China’s strategic 
partner (at the end of 2011), the establishment of the China-Central and Eastern Europe 
Cooperation Secretariat in September 2012, the 16 + 1 initiative and the One Belt One 
Road. This process is quite a new phenomenon but not unsurprising: on one hand, the 
transformation of the global economy, as well as China’s economic restructuring are 
responsible for growing Chinese interest in central and eastern Europe, while on the 
other hand, central and eastern Europe represents new challenges and new opportunities 
for China, too. As an additional impetus, the European ‘sovereign debt crisis’ has made 
central and eastern European governments more open to non-European, including 
Chinese business opportunities in order to recover from the period of recession.
The aim of this chapter is to map Chinese investment flows and types of involvement, 
and to analyse differences between countries, as well as to identify the determinants 
of Chinese FDI in the largest recipient countries within the region (Hungary, Poland, 
1. China sees central and eastern Europe as a block of 16 countries. Among the 16 CEE countries which are 
involved in the so-called Chinese 16+1 initiative there are 11 EU countries (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia) and five EU candidate countries (Albania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, FYROM (Macedonia), Montenegro, and Serbia). 
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Czechia, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria), with a special focus on the role of host-
country institutions, such as the impact of institutional change resulting from 
integration with the EU, Chinese diaspora, promotion policies, privatisation and so 
on. According to our hypothesis, Chinese investments in central and eastern European 
countries differ from that of Western companies in terms of specific institutional 
factors that seem important for Chinese companies: based on Chinese diaspora in the 
host country and the quality of political relations Hungary has attracted the largest 
Chinese FDI in central and eastern Europe, outperforming also Poland, the regional 
leader in attracting FDI. The decisive role seems to be played by the Hungarian Chinese 
diaspora and the country’s long (since 2003), friendly relations with China. Poland only 
started nurturing relations with China around 2009. Czechia, the third largest recipient 
of Chinese FDI in central and eastern Europe, recorded an increase in Chinese FDI 
inflows only in 2012, which was caused by significant change in its diplomacy, from 
being very critical about human rights and the independence of Tibet to being very 
friendly and open to Chinese investment. This hypothesis is in response to the recent 
call to combine macroeconomic and institutional factors for a better understanding of 
internationalization of companies (Dunning and Lundan 2008).
As the topic of Chinese FDI in central and eastern European countries is a rather 
unploughed furrow, the authors conducted several personal and online interviews 
with representatives of various Chinese companies in central and eastern Europe (at 
major Chinese investors in the region the interviews were conducted anonymously). 
In order to place Chinese-central and eastern Europe investment relations within the 
framework of China’s global investment strategy, the authors studied existing theories 
and literature on Chinese investments in general, as well as on Chinese FDI in the 
developed world.
After the introductory section, the chapter describes the changing patterns and 
motivations of Chinese outward FDI in the transition economies and contains the 
authors’ findings on characteristics and motivations behind Chinese FDI in central and 
eastern European countries. The chapter provides a detailed description of the impact 
of both macroeconomic and institutional factors.
2. Chinese outward FDI in central and eastern European countries 
Most research on motivations for FDI apply the eclectic or OLI paradigm of Dunning 
(1992, 1998), which states that firms will venture abroad when they possess firm-
specific advantages – namely ownership and internalisation advantages – and when 
they can utilise location advantages to benefit from the attractions particular locations 
provide. Different types of investment incentives attract different types of FDI, which 
Dunning (1992) divided into four categories: (i) market-seeking (tariff-jumping or 
export-substituting FDI is a variant of market-seeking FDI; Kinoshita and Campos 
2003); (ii) resource-seeking; (iii) efficiency-seeking; (iv) and asset-seeking. The factors 
attracting market-seeking multinationals usually include market size, as reflected 
in GDP per capita and market growth (GDP growth). Investments aimed at seeking 
improved efficiency are determined by low labour costs, tax incentives and so on 
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(Resmini 2005: 3). Finally the companies interested in acquiring foreign assets might 
be motivated by a common culture and language, as well as trade costs (Blonigen and 
Piger 2014; Hijzen et al. 2008). It should be emphasised that some FDI decisions may 
be based on a complex mix of factors (Resmini 2005: 3; Blonigen and Piger 2014). 
Much of the extant research and theoretical discussion is based on FDI outflows from 
developed countries, for which market-seeking and efficiency-seeking FDI is most 
prominent (Buckley et al. 2007; Leitão and Faustino 2010). Chinese outward FDI is 
characterised by natural resource-seeking, market-seeking (Buckley et al., 2007) and 
recently also by strategic asset-seeking (Di Minin et al. 2012; Zhang et al. 2012). 
The rapid growth of outward FDI from emerging and developing countries has been 
subject to numerous studies trying to account for special features of emerging-country 
multinationals’ behaviour that is not captured by mainstream theories. For example, 
Mathews extended the OLI paradigm with the ‘linking, leverage, learning framework’ 
(LLL) that explains the rapid international expansion of companies from Asia Pacific 
(Mathews 2006). Linking means partnerships or joint ventures that latecomers form 
with foreign companies in order to minimise the risks of internationalisation, as well as 
to acquire ‘resources that are otherwise not available’ (Mathews 2006: 19). Latecomers 
when forming links with incumbents also analyse how the resources can be leveraged. 
They look for resources that can be easily imitated, transferred or substituted. Finally, 
repeated processes of linking and leveraging allow latecomers to learn and conduct 
international operations more effectively (Mathews 2006: 20). 
Nevertheless, traditional economic factors seem to be insufficient in explaining multi-
nationals’ FDI decisions. In the past decade international economics and business 
research has acknowledged the importance of institutional factors in influencing the 
behaviour of multinationals (for example, Tihanyi et al. 2012). According to North, 
institutions are the ‘rules of the game’, ‘the humanly devised constraints that shape 
human interactions’ (North 1990: 3). Institutions serve to reduce uncertainties related 
with transactions and minimise transaction costs (North 1990). As a result, Dunning 
and Lundan extended the OLI model with institution-based location advantages, which 
explains that institutions developed at home and host economies shape multinationals’ 
geographical scope and organisational effectiveness (Dunning and Lundan 2008).
The transformation of central and eastern European countries from centrally planned 
to market economies has resulted in significant research on FDI flows to these 
transition countries. However, most studies focus on the period before 2004, which 
is the year of accession of eight central and eastern European countries2 into the EU 
(Carstensen and Toubal 2004; Janicki and Wunnawa 2004; Kawai 2006). Investors, 
mainly from EU15 countries, were attracted by relatively low unit labor costs, 
market size, openness to trade and proximity (Bevan and Estrin 2004; Clausing and 
Dorobantu 2005; Janicki and Wunnawa 2004; UNCTAD 2007). Diverse institutional 
factors influenced inward FDI: in the case of central and eastern European countries, 
the prospects of their economic integration with the EU increased FDI inflows, while 
in the central and eastern European countries that lagged behind in terms of their 
2. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia.
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implementation of transition policies – which postponed their EU accession – FDI 
inflows were discouraged (Bevan and Estrin 2004). 
When analysing the impact of the institutional characteristics of central and eastern 
European countries, such as forms of privatisation, capital market development, state 
of laws and country risk, the studies show varying results. According to Bevan and 
Estrin (2004: 777) institutional aspects were not a significant factor in the investment 
decisions of foreign firms. Carstensen and Toubal (2004) argue that they could explain 
uneven distribution of FDI across central and eastern European countries. Fabry and 
Zeghni (2010: 80) point out that in transition countries institutional weaknesses – such 
as poor infrastructure, lack of developed subcontractor network and an unfavourable 
business environment – may explain FDI agglomeration more than positive externalities 
that are effects of linkages, such as spillovers, clusters and networks. Kinoshita and 
Campos (2008), based on a study of 19 Latin American and 25 East European countries 
in the period 1989–2004, found that structural reforms, especially financial reform and 
privatisation, had a strong impact on FDI inflows.
Although the countries examined here – Hungary, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia 
and Czechia – differ in many respects, they have some common features as well. They 
have been in the process of economic catching up over recent decades; their development 
paths are defined mainly by the global and European powers, rules and trends; and FDI 
has a key role in restructuring their economies. Most of the abovementioned countries 
have started to get more interested in Chinese relations – more properly in attracting 
Chinese investments and boosting trade relations – since the new millennium, although 
the economic and financial crisis of 2008 drew their attention more than ever to the 
potential of Chinese economic relations. 
Source: CEIC China Premium Database, based on Chinese statistics.
Figure 1 China’s outward FDI stock in central and eastern Europe countries, 2003–2014, 
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As Figure 1 shows, Chinese companies started to make their first investments in central 
and eastern Europe already in the early 2000s when the countries of the region became 
members of the European Union (2004 in the case of the Visegrad countries and 2007 
in the case of Romania and Bulgaria), but the economic and financial crisis of 2008 
resulted in a major upsurge in this regard. As a result, central and eastern European 
economies account for 8 per cent of total Chinese investment in Europe. 
Although China considers the region as a bloc, some countries seem to be more popular 
investment destinations than others: the selected six countries are the main recipients 
of Chinese outward FDI among EU member states. Among them, Hungary and Poland 
have received the bulk of Chinese investment in recent years.
2.1 Macroeconomic factors
As mentioned earlier, Chinese capital in central and eastern Europe, as a share of total 
invested capital, is still very small – only in Hungary is Chinese FDI stock above 1 per 
cent of GDP3 – but in the past few years this capital inflow has accelerated significantly 
and has also played an important role in the region’s recovery from the crisis. In the 
case of the selected countries – with the exception of Hungary – attempts have been 
growing to attract Chinese companies in the past two to five years. In Hungary this 
process began after 2003.
Chinese investors typically target the secondary and tertiary sectors of the selected 
six countries. Initially, Chinese investment flowed mainly into manufacturing 
(assembly). The main Chinese investors targeting these six countries are interested 
primarily in telecommunications, electronics, chemicals, transportation and energy. 
Their investments in these six countries are motivated mainly by market-seeking, but 
they also seek brands and new technologies (for example, acquisition of the Polish 
Huta Stalowa Wola by Chinese Liu Gong Machinery or the Polish Novago by China 
Everbright International Ltd.) or market niches that they can fill in European markets. 
Over time, services have attracted more and more investment, for example in Hungary 
and Poland there are branches of the Bank of China and the Industrial and Commercial 
Bank of China, as well as offices of some of the largest Chinese law offices, such as 
Yingke (in Hungary since 2010, in Poland since 2012) and Dacheng (in Poland since 
2011, in Hungary since 2012). 
As already mentioned, the main type of Chinese FDI in the selected countries is 
market-seeking investment: by entering central and eastern European markets 
Chinese companies gain access not only to the EU, but also to the CIS, Mediterranean 
countries and EFTA (Wisniewski 2012: 121), and in interviews Chinese investors also 
speak about the possibility of accessing North American markets. In addition, there are 
cases of Chinese companies following their customers to central and eastern European 
countries, as in the case of Victory Technology (supplier to Philips, LG and TPV) or 
Dalian Talent Poland (supplier of candles to IKEA).
3. When using Hungarian cumulative data (see the country-level analysis below).
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When seeking for factors that may make the region a favourable investment destination 
for China, the quality and the cost of labour is to be considered first (company interviews). 
A skilled labour force is available in sectors in which Chinese interest is growing, while 
labour costs are lower in central and eastern Europe than the EU average. However, 
there are differences within the region – and the selected six countries – as well; unit 
labour costs are cheaper in Bulgaria and Romania than in Hungary, Czechia, Slovakia 
and Poland. These differences do not seem to really influence Chinese investors as 
there is more investment in Hungary, Poland and Czechia than in Romania and 
Bulgaria. One explanation for this may be agglomeration, as generally outward FDI in 
these countries is the highest in the region. With a corporate income tax rate of 10 per 
cent, Bulgaria has the most favourable tax regime in the region. Nevertheless, it has 
been the least popular investment destination for Chinese companies in the selected 
countries so far.
According to Eurostat’s ‘Demography Report 2010’, Poland and Romania are the biggest 
markets in terms of the size of population (38.1 and 21.5 million), while the others are 
medium-sized (10.6 million in Czechia, 10 million in Hungary and 7.6 million people 
in Bulgaria), although from the Chinese point of view all of them are considered to 
be rather small. Czechia, Poland and Hungary are relatively affluent markets as well: 
based on the IMF WEO database, GDP per capita is highest in Czechia (17,569 USD in 
2015) and Slovakia (15,979 USD in 2015), somewhat lower in Poland (12,492 USD in 
2015) and Hungary (12,239 USD in 2015), but considerably lower in Romania (8,955 
USD in 2015) and especially Bulgaria (6,842 USD in 2015). 
The macroeconomic factors do not fully explain the decisions behind Chinese FDI in 
central and eastern Europe. Hungary, the largest recipient of Chinese investment, is not 
the most attractive location in terms of either cutting costs or the search for potential 
markets. This indicates that institutions may be crucial when choosing location for 
Chinese companies.
2.2 Institutional factors
Institutional factors can be divided into two levels, supranational and national, both 
of which are important elements in the location decisions of Chinese companies in 
central and eastern Europe. As for supranational institutional factors, we can state 
that the change of the institutional setting of central and eastern European countries 
due to their economic integration into the EU (in 2004 and 2007) has been the most 
important driver of Chinese outward FDI in the region, especially in the manufacturing 
sector. The Chinese statistics on OFDI for the period 2003–2011 show that all major 
recipients of Chinese investments from the old EU (Germany, France, Italy and also 
the United Kingdom) recorded significant increases in inflows in the years 2004–2005 
(MOFCOM 2012: 32–33). It must be noted, however, that the Chinese government’s 
‘Go Global’ policy gained momentum in 2004, with growth of Chinese FDI all over the 
world (MOFCOM 2012: 6). The difference between Chinese FDI in the old EU and in 
the new member states is that in the former it mostly involved mergers and acquisitions 
(Hanemann and Rosen 2012: 44). Chinese FDI in the new member states in 2005–2007 
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was motivated mainly by the opportunity to access EU15 markets; central and eastern 
European markets were of secondary importance. Central and eastern European 
countries’ EU membership allowed Chinese investors to avoid trade barriers and the 
countries served as an assembly base due to their relatively low labour costs. 
Chinese investment in Central and eastern European countries in 2004–2006 were 
dominated by firms from the electronics sector, especially LCD TVs producers, as 
their exports to the EU were restricted by quotas. Although the recent EU anti-subsidy 
investigation on solar panels from China resulted in a temporary delay in imposing 
anti-subsidy tariffs, it may encourage Chinese solar panel manufacturers to invest in 
central and eastern European countries. There are already cases of company takeovers 
in the renewable energy sector, such as Orient Solar in Hungary, and according to 
the media some companies from the solar sector are considering investing in Poland. 
The motive of overcoming trade barriers is similar to that of Japanese investments 
in central and eastern European countries in the second half of the 1990s. Japanese 
multinationals established assembly plants there, but sold their products mainly in the 
affluent Western European markets (Woon 2003). 
Another aspect of EU membership that is inducing Chinese investment in central and 
eastern European countries is institutional stability (for example, protection of property 
rights), as one of the drivers of Chinese outward FDI is the unstable institutional, 
economic and political environment of their home country (for example, Morck et al. 
2007). This is in line with the findings of Clegg and Voss (2011: 101), who argue that 
Chinese outward FDI in the EU shows ‘an institutional arbitrage strategy’, as 
 ‘Chinese firms invest in localities that offer clearer, more transparent and stable 
institutional environments. Such environments, like the EU, might lack the rapid 
economic growth recorded in China, but they offer greater planning and property 
rights security, as well as dedicated professional services that can support business 
development.’ (Witt and Lewin 2007; Wu 2011)
In their investment decisions in central and eastern European countries Chinese 
firms might also be attracted by free trade agreements between the EU and third 
countries, such as Canada and the USA (still under negotiation), as well as EU policies 
towards neighbouring countries, as they claim that their central and eastern European 
subsidiaries are to sell products in the host, EU, Northern American or even global 
markets. This driver might also explain some Chinese investment in Bulgaria and 
Romania before their EU accession, such as SVA Group in Bulgaria. However this type 
of institutional factor requires further research. 
Moreover, Chinese firms’ central and eastern European subsidiaries enable them to 
participate in public procurement. In the case of government procurement, however, 
one of the conditions is ‘Made in the EU’ and EU-located subsidiaries make it possible 
to meet this requirement.
Recently, Chinese firms interested in investing in central and eastern European 
countries have become more inquisitive about food safety standards and certificates. 
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They would be interested in exporting agricultural products with EU safety certificates 
back to China where food safety has been a problem.
Regarding national-level institutional factors – such as strategic agreements and 
privatisation opportunities – their significance began to increase only recently. Before 
their integration in the EU central and eastern European countries focused mainly on 
fulfilling the EU entry criteria and generally neglected relations with countries from 
other regions, except for Hungary. Only since the aftermath of the global financial 
crisis of 2008 have we observed increased interest on the part of central and eastern 
European governments in attracting Chinese investors. In the case of Poland only 
recently have Chinese firms also been attracted by the privatisation of state enterprises, 
which provide access to technology (patents), brands, distribution networks and 
manufacturing capacity for European markets. 
To sum up, national-level institutional factors that impact location choice within CEE 
countries seem to be the size and feedback of the Chinese ethnic minority, investment 
incentives and subsidies such as special economic zones, possibilities of acquiring 
visas and permanent residence permits (in exchange for investment), privatisation 
opportunities, the quality of political relations and the government’s willingness to 
cooperate. A clear example of this is Hungary’s good relations and very high level of 
Chinese FDI compared with other central and eastern European countries, while it is 
said that Liu Gong’s acquisition of HSW in Poland might have been delayed because 
of China Overseas Engineering Group (COVEC)’s problems with building part of the 
Polish highway. 
2.3 Country-level analysis
As already mentioned, the selected six countries account for the majority of the 
population and economic output of central and eastern Europe and all of them 
have strengthened their relations with China in recent years. Now they have several 
Chinese companies investing in various sectors with a growing number of mergers and 
acquisitions in recent years (see Table 1). Hungary still receives the majority of Chinese 
investment in the region, followed by Poland and Czechia. Romania and Bulgaria have 
been pushing forward in recent years, attracting increasing amounts of Chinese FDI, 
while Slovakia lags a little behind due to its small size and lack of efficient transport 
infrastructure. The main forms and sectors of Chinese investment are similar in all 
countries, although it is more diverse in the more popular target countries (Hungary 
and Poland), while there are certain sectors – for example, agriculture and food – in 
which Chinese companies have preferred to target Bulgaria and Romania.
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Hungary
Chinese investment in Hungary started to increase significantly after the country 
joined the EU in 2004, which points to the supra-national institutional factor of EU 
membership in attracting Chinese companies. According to Chinese statistics, there was 
a rapid increase from USD 0.65 million in 2005 to USD 370.1 million in 2010. In 2010, 
Hungary took 89 per cent of total Chinese capital flows into the region (Chen 2012). 
By 2012, the amount of Chinese investments had further increased, reaching USD 507 
million according to MOFCOM data, by far the highest in the region. The amount is 
far greater when taking into account cumulative Hungarian data, because a significant 
portion of Chinese investment is received via intermediary countries or companies and 
therefore appears elsewhere in Chinese statistics. According to Hungarian reports, 
Chinese investment in Hungary by 2015 was about USD 3–3.5 billion or more, which 
represents around 2–2.5 per cent of Hungary’s total FDI stock. More than USD 1.5 
billion of that is the investment of the Chinese chemical company Wanhua, which 
acquired a 96 per cent stake in the Hungarian chemical company BorsodChem through 
its Dutch subsidiary in 2010 and 2011. This subsidiary also subsequently invested in 
the development of BorsodChem. It is the largest Chinese investment in central and 
eastern Europe so far. 
Table 1 China’s outward FDI stock in central and eastern European countries: main forms, 
sectors and companies
 
FDI stock, 
2013, USD
Main 
form of 
investment
Main 
sectors
Most 
important 
Chinese 
companies
Romania
164 million
Greenfield
ICT / IT, tobac-
co, agriculture, 
food, machinery, 
transportation
Huawei, ZTE, 
Shantuo Agri-
cultural Machin-
ery Equipment, 
China Tobacco, 
China Shipping, 
COSCO, Shanxi 
Yuncheng,
Bulgaria
147 million
Greenfield
IT / ICT, 
television, 
agriculture, 
food, machinery
Huawei, ZTE, 
Shanghai Video 
and Audio 
Electronics, 
Great Wall 
Motors, Tianjin 
State Farms, 
Insigma Tech.
Slovakia
90 million
Greenfield
automotive in-
dustry, IT / ICT 
SaarGummi, ZVL 
Auto, Inalfa Roof 
Systems, Mesnac, 
Lenovo, Huawei
Czechia
220 million
Greenfield, 
(M&A)
Electronics, IT / 
ICT, transport 
equipment, 
food, media, 
aviation
Shanxi 
Yuncheng, 
Changhong, 
Noark, Huawei, 
ZTE, Shanghai 
Maling
Poland
226 million
 
Greenfield, 
(M&A)
IT / ICT, elec-
tronics, heavy 
machinery, 
publishing and 
printing, real 
estate, municipal 
waste processing
Liu Gong Ma-
chinery, Huawei, 
ZTE, Haoneng 
Packaging, 
Shanxi Yuncheng 
Plate-making 
Group, Sino 
Frontier Proper-
ties Ltd., China 
Everbright Inter-
national Ltd.
Hungary
533 million
Greenfield / 
brownfield, M&A, 
joint ventures
Chemical, IT / 
ICT, electronics, 
wholesale and 
retail, banking, 
hotels and cater-
ing, logistics, real 
estate 
Wanhua, Huawei, 
ZTE, Lenovo, 
Sevenstar 
Electronics, BYD 
Electronics, 
Comlink
Source: Authors’ investigation. FDI stock data based on Chinese statistics (CEIC database).
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In Hungary, most significant Chinese multinationals operate in the manufacturing 
sector and have started to increase their investments in Hungary in the past few years. 
Chinese multinationals’ investments in Hungary are usually not greenfield: Chinese 
multinationals have bought the plants of other companies or replaced former partners 
of EMS providers. Although Chinese multinationals represent a relatively small share 
of total FDI stock in Hungary, they have saved and/or created jobs and contributed to 
economic growth with their investments and exports during the global economic and 
financial crisis. Furthermore, many of them (for example, Lenovo, ZTE, Huawei, Bank 
of China) have turned their Hungarian businesses into the European regional hub of 
their activities (Szunomár et al. 2014).
Hungary’s importance as a regional distribution centre can be observed in the field 
of trade, too. Some big retail and wholesale, as well as business matching centres in 
Budapest – for example, Asia Center, China Brand Trade Center, Budapest Fashion 
Center, Budapest China Mart4 – support the distribution of different Chinese (or other 
Asian) products5 in central and eastern Europe and also supply Hungarian customers. 
Retail shops run by the Chinese community can be found not only in these centres, 
but also throughout Budapest and other Hungarian cities and towns. Besides retail, 
Chinese immigrants often choose to operate restaurants in Hungary. 
In addition to manufacturing, the investment of Chinese companies in Hungary covers 
industries such as chemicals, telecommunications, trade, wholesale or retail, banking, 
hotels and catering, logistics, real estate and consultancy. According to the data of the 
Hungarian Investment and Trade Agency (HITA) more than 5,000 Chinese companies 
operate in Hungary, including several multinationals, but most are small businesses 
operating in the service or retail sector: restaurants, perfumeries and so-called ‘Chinese 
shops’, selling everything from shoes and clothes to plastic toys. According to the 
Hungarian Central Statistical Office, the number of Chinese-controlled foreign affiliates 
increased steadily between 2008 and 2010 and then decreased slightly in 2011. 
In addition to Wanhua, the major investors are Huawei, ZTE Corporation, Lenovo, 
Sevenstar Electronics Co., BYD Electronics and Comlink. Regarding entry mode, 
there are examples of quasi-greenfield6 investments (Huawei, ZTE, Lenovo), as well 
as mergers and acquisitions (Wanhua) and joint ventures (Orient Solar, BBCA). 
Another significant investment is the China Brand Trade Center (an investment by the 
Chinese company Genertec), which is a market platform for branded and competitive 
Chinese products and their suppliers. Typically, while Hungary would prefer greenfield 
investments (as they create jobs), Chinese investors tend to choose the forms of mergers 
and acquisitions and joint ventures when investing in Hungary.
The national-level institutional factors are the most prominent in case of Hungary. In 
Hungary the combination of traditional economic factors with institutional ones seems 
4. Asia Center and China Brand Trade Center are owned by Strabag SE. Budapest Fashion Center and Budapest 
China Mart are owned by Chinese investors. 
5. For example, entertainment electronics, household electronics, IT products, bags, gifts, crafts, accessories, 
jewellery, shoes, footwear, textile, home textile and garments.
6. The parent companies Huawei, ZTE or Lenovo have not built new operational facilities (as they chose the form 
of contract manufacturing) but created new long-term jobs by hiring new employees. 
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to play an important role in attracting Chinese investors. Hungary has had historically 
good political relations and earlier than other central and eastern European countries, 
from 2003, intensified bilateral relations in order to attract Chinese FDI. Hungary is 
the only country in the region that introduced special incentives for foreign investors 
from outside the EU, which is a possibility to receive a residence visa when fulfilling 
the requirement of a certain level of investment in Hungary.7 Furthermore, Hungary 
has the largest Chinese population (diaspora) in the region, which is an acknowledged 
attracting factor of Chinese FDI. Based on the extant literature the diaspora is a relational 
asset in terms of ownership advantage (for example, Buckley et al. 2007). An example 
is Hisense’s explanation of the decision to invest in Hungary as motivated, besides 
traditional economic factors, by ‘good diplomatic, economic, trade and educational 
relations with China; big Chinese population; Chinese trade and commercial networks, 
associations already formed’ (CIEGA 2007). 
Poland
Although Poland is the leading recipient of FDI in central and eastern Europe it has 
attracted little Chinese FDI. This may be partially explained by the rather cool political 
relations between the two countries since the early 1990s, when Polish politicians often 
criticised Beijing for violating human rights and supported the case of Tibet (Palonka 
and Szczypa 2009). Only from around 2009 did the Polish government start to make 
efforts aimed at improving relations between Warsaw and Beijing, referred to by some 
as ‘making up for lost time’ (Heiduk and McCaleb 2014). Before Poland’s entry into the 
EU Chinese investments were almost insignificant; in 2000 they amounted to USD 10 
million and by 2003 had increased only slightly to USD 17.8 million (National Bank 
of Poland website). According to Polish data, by the end of 2012 Chinese FDI stock in 
Poland had increased more than sixteen times to USD 288.1 million. However, their 
importance is still low, representing only 0.1 per cent of Poland’s total FDI stock. 
According to MOFCOM, at the end of 2012 China’s FDI stock in Poland amounted to 
USD 208 million. However, as already mentioned, statistics on China’s outward FDI 
differ between MOFCOM’s and host countries’ national sources (for example, Apoteker 
2012; Clegg and Voss 2012). In addition to intermediaries or subsidiaries these 
differences may result from the limitations of Chinese data.8
There are about 700 firms with Chinese capital in Poland but the majority of them (574 
firms in 2011) are small companies employing fewer than nine persons. Most investors 
are private companies; state-owned companies include ZTE, LiuGong Machinery 
and Nuctech. By 2004 Chinese investors were mainly small companies in wholesale 
and retail trade. The years since the global financial crisis have seen the emergence 
7. Third-country nationals are allowed to acquire Hungarian permanent residency status through investing 
in Special Hungarian Government Bonds that have a minimum five-year maturity. The minimum initial 
investment by each subscriber is 250,000 EUR.
8. MOFCOM data are underreported as they include investments approved by MOFCOM. Thus, in practice 
investment projects (especially small projects) that do not require approval or unauthorized projects are not 
included. The recent administrative reforms decentralized the approval system of smaller investment projects, 
which may enhance under-reporting (Apoteker 2012: 14; Korniyenko and Sakatsume 2009).
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of mergers and acquisitions and a wider representation of sectors in Chinese FDI in 
Poland. By 2016 the major investors from China were China Everbright International, 
Liu Gong Machinery, Haoneng Packaging, Shanxi Yuncheng Plate-making Group, 
Sino Frontier Properties Ltd., Suzhou Victory Precision Manufacture Co. and TPV 
Technology Ltd (Heiduk and McCaleb 2014; Forsal 2016). 
Chinese investment in Poland is mainly in electronics, production of TV sets and LCD 
monitors (TCL Corporation, Victory Technology Polska, Chung Hong Electronics 
Poland, Digital View), electro-machinery (Nuctech), heavy machinery (LiuGong 
Machinery), ecology, such as municipal waste processing and alternative gas production 
(China Everbright International), publishing and printing (Haoneng Packaging), 
manufacturing of metals and metal products (Shanxi Yuncheng Plate-making Group), 
hospitality and real estate (Min Hoong Development Co., Sino Frontier Properties 
Ltd.), distribution of goods (GD Poland Investments Sp. z o.o.) and IT (Huawei, ZTE) 
(Heiduk et al. 2012). 
In recent years Chinese FDI in services has increased with the establishment of branches 
of Bank of China (2012) and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (2012), as well 
as offices of the largest law firms in China, Yingke (2012) and Dacheng. 
Most of the Chinese firms investing in Poland engage in greenfield investments. 
According to Hanemann and Rosen (2012) at the end of 2011 there were 15 greenfield 
projects. However, recently there were four cases of mergers and acquisitions in 
construction machinery (Liu Gong), aviation (Lantian Aerospace Industrial Park), 
ecology in the form of municipal waste processing and alternative fuel production 
(Everbright International, the biggest Chinese investment in Poland by the end of 
2016) and automotive parts (Tri Ring) (PAIZ interview; Forsal 2016). The latter is said 
to be the result of Wen Jiabao’s visit in 2012. 
Chinese FDI enters the Polish market also through their mergers and acquisitions 
in third countries. For example, Beijing West Industry (BWI) Group (a joint-venture 
of Shougang Corp., Bao’an Investment Corp. and Fangshan State-Owned Asset 
Management Corp.) in November 2009 acquired the Chassis Division of former 
Delphi Corporation (USA), together with its subsidiaries, which included Polish 
production plant in Krosno and an R&D centre in Cracow that employs 200 engineers 
(AutomotiveSuppliers.pl, 24.11.2009; Deloitte 2012). In 2013, Chinese Shuanghui 
International acquired the American Smithfoods along with its Polish subsidiary, 
which is one of the most recognised meat producing companies in Poland, Animex.
A further factor playing a role in the case of Chinese FDI in Poland is EU membership, 
which makes it possible to avoid tariff barriers. Besides electronics companies such as 
TCL, Victory Technology and Digital View, another example is Dalian Talent. Dalian 
Talent Polska was established in 2009 in response to anti-dumping sanctions imposed 
by the EU. Dalian Talent is among the top three candle producers in China, with 
portfolio customers such as IKEA, Wal-Mart and Metro AG (Zhang 2016). Nuctech 
sells large-scale cargo-scanning equipment used for inspections at seaports, border 
crossings, airports and railways. The company established its subsidiary in Poland in 
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2004 (with EU membership as a supra-national factor) with the aim of targeting mainly 
the western European market. In the period 2004–2008 Nuctech increased its market 
share in the EU by 140 per cent (Castle 2010). In 2011 the company stated that the old 
EU market had become saturated and that it would now focus more on central and 
eastern European countries, which benefit from EU aid for infrastructure. Due to the 
nature of the products it sells (mainly to public entities) Nuctech needed a subsidiary 
located within the EU to be eligible to take part in public procurement in EU member 
states. Nuctech’s Warsaw subsidiary also benefitted from the EU’s neighbouring country 
policy as it also sells to Turkey. Another example of a company using the EU’s free trade 
agreements and neighbouring country policies is Liugong Machinery’s subsidiary in 
Poland, which targets the EU and CIS, as well as North American markets.
As for the national-level factors, Poland started actively promoting itself with Chinese 
firms from the EXPO 2010 in Shanghai. Since 2010 the Polish Information and Foreign 
Investment Agency (PAIZ) has made its website available in Chinese and in 2011 it set 
up an overseas office in Shanghai. In 2013, PAIZ launched the website GoPoland.gov.pl 
in Chinese with the goal of attracting Chinese investors to Poland. Recently, the Polish 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs established a working group for economic cooperation 
between Poland and China. Moreover, in Poland there are two special economic zones 
with support services dedicated to Chinese investors (in Kielce and Koszalin). However, 
in most of the analysed countries there are voices complaining about their government’s 
lack of a unified strategy towards Chinese investors. 
Poland also offers a possibility to acquire state-owned enterprises, as the privatisation 
process there has not been completed. Poland still has about 400 state companies to 
be privatised that might be attractive to Chinese investors. For example, in early 2012 
Liugong Machinery bought Huta Stalowa Wola’s construction equipment division and 
its distribution subsidiary, Dressta. Until 2005, Dressta was a joint venture between 
Komatsu America and Huta Stalowa Wola and has sales offices around the world. 
Secondly, in 2013 China’s Tri Ring Group Corporation acquired Polish Fabryka Łożysk 
Tocznych, producer of bearings for automotive sector.
Czechia 
Czechia is one of the most successful central and eastern European countries in 
attracting foreign direct investment, although Chinese investments were negligible till 
2012. According to Chinese statistics Chinese FDI in Czechia started to increase from 
2006 (in 2005 it was USD 1.38 million, compared with USD 14.67 million in 2006) 
and reached USD 66.83 million in 2011, which was still the lowest amount of the six 
selected countries. The turning point was 2012 when Chinese statistics showed USD 
202.45 million investment in Czechia.9 However, there is an inverse discrepancy here 
as, according to data from the Czech National Bank, Chinese FDI in Czechia was USD 
76.6 million in 2012.10
9. Total FDI to Czechia was 10.6 billion USD according to UNCTAD.
10. The official statistics explain this huge increase with the recalculation of stock for 2012 after adjustment of 
historical data. Experts in Czechia had no information on the components of this growth.
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The main companies include electronics production facilities (Shanxi Yuncheng Plating 
Group, Changhong, Noark), IT (Huawei, ZTE Corp) and a manufacturer of transport 
equipment (CITIC Marmes Bicycles), as well as a food producer (Shanghai Maling). But 
there are planned FDI projects in Czechia in the textile, food, automotive and machinery 
sectors. With the exception of CITIC Marmes Bicycles, which is a joint venture founded 
in 2007, all of these are greenfield investments.
So far the biggest Chinese investment project in Czechia, before the launching of the 
Warsaw Initiative, is Changhong Europe Electric, the LCD and LED TV manufacturer 
(approximately USD 330 million) in the Nymburk Industrial Zone (central Czechia). The 
other important Chinese investor is Shanghai Maling Aquarius, food producer, which 
established a factory nearby Teplice (northern Czechia) with assets of USD 22.5 million 
in 2007; 90 per cent of its production is exported to the EU and the United States. The 
IT giants Huawei and ZTE also opened offices in Czechia; so far they employ about 350 
local staff and their annual turnover in the Czech market exceeded USD 80 million 
in 2010. Huawei and ZTE cooperate with local mobile phone operators in Czechia 
and established their own sales outlets for mobile phones and smartphones. Besides, 
numerous small Chinese companies sell consumer electronics in Czechia (Fürst 2014). 
Although Chinese investments in Czechia are associated mainly with manufacturing, 
in the long term Czech officials are planning to attract larger and more long-term 
investments through cooperation in higher value-added projects, such as technology 
and development centres in cooperation with universities. Negotiations are being held 
on establishing the first Czech-Chinese industrial zone in northern Moravia, and also 
on establishing direct flights between Prague and Beijing. Some new investment plans 
were announced recently as a result of the diplomatic rapprochement of the Czech 
government. China’s sixth largest private company CEFC would buy a majority stake 
in a top brewery group (Pivovary Lobkowicz Group) and a share in an airline company 
(Travel Service, operator of airline Smartwings), two buildings in central Prague and 
double its stake in J&T Finance Group to 9.99 per cent, aiming to increase that to 30 
per cent. Acquiring minority stakes in communications firm Medea Group and media 
company Empresa Media (which owns television channel TV Barrandov and publishes 
the weekly magazine Tyden) is also among Chinese plans.
Slovakia 
The amount of Chinese investments was insignificant in Slovakia prior to 2007. Since 
2007 we can observe varying levels of Chinese investments in the country. According to 
Turcsányi (2014: 97) ‘while little can be asserted due to large fluctuations, we can note 
the start of investment even before the crisis. Subsequently, investments increased, but 
it is difficult to establish whether this was the result of the crisis or some other factors, 
which may include the natural development of Chinese investors’ increasingly available 
sources and willingness to penetrate new destinations.’
According to Chinese statistics Chinese outward FDI stock in Slovakia was below USD 
100 million in 2014. The number of Chinese investments is hard to tell, but according 
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to available sources it can be established that it is relatively modest – compared with 
both neighbouring countries and other investors in Slovakia, including other Asian 
companies. According to Turcsányi’s estimates (2014: 98), ‘if also companies owned by 
a non-China based but Chinese-owned subsidiary are counted, we can estimate current 
Chinese investments in Slovakia to be up to EUR 100–200 million.’
The main companies operate in the automotive industry, including SaarGummi 
(production of sealants for the automotive industry), ZVL Auto (production of 
controlling stakes), Inalfa Roof Systems (special roof windows for cars) and Mesnac 
(research and development centre focused on development of the tyre machinery). 
IT companies such as Lenovo and Huawei are also present in the country. There are 
planned FDI projects in Slovakia in shoe production (Flame Shoes) and the automotive 
sector (Zhuzhou).
Romania and Bulgaria11
Chinese FDI in Romania was the highest among all central and eastern European 
countries until 2005;12 now – according to Chinese statistics – Romania is only the 
fourth largest recipient after Hungary, Poland and Czechia, with Chinese FDI worth 
USD 161.09 million.13 
Investment is basically greenfield, covering mainly manufacturing in industries such as 
IT, tobacco, machinery, motorcycles and transportation. The main Chinese investors 
are Huawei, ZTE Corp., Shantuo Agricultural Machinery Equipment, China Tobacco 
International Europe Company SRL, DHS (motorcycles), China Shipping, COSCO, 
Yuncheng Plate-Making and F&J Group, an international investment company, which 
helps Chinese companies to invest and carry out mergers in Europe. The number of 
firms with Chinese capital is around 10,000,14 the highest in the region, although most 
are small firms operating in the service or retail sectors.
An example of a Chinese company benefitting from Romania’s EU membership is 
machinery producer Shantuo Agricultural Machinery Equipment, whose main export 
markets are Canada, Russia and the United States.
Chinese FDI in Bulgaria started to become noticeable from 2007 when Bulgaria joined 
the EU. According to Chinese data, it increased sevenfold from USD 18.6 million in 
2010 to USD 126.74 million in 2012.15
The investments are mainly greenfield with some mergers and acquisitions, mainly in 
agriculture and energy. The targeted industries – telecommunication, television, IT, 
agriculture, machinery – are similar to those of Romania, with two exceptions: car 
11. In the case of Romania and Bulgaria the discrepancy between Chinese and national data is negligible.
12. In 2005, Chinese investment was 39.43 million USD in Romania, according to Chinese statistics, which further 
increased in the coming years, but to a lesser extent compared with Hungary and Poland.
13. Chinese FDI in Romania constitutes 0.83 per cent of total FDI.
14. Their share in the total number of commercial companies with foreign capital is 5.58 per cent.
15. It is 0.214 per cent of all foreign investment to Bulgaria.
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assembly (Great Wall Motors) and desulfurisation (Insigma Tech.). Chinese investors 
are also planning further investments in agriculture (production of tobacco and 
yoghurt). In addition, they are about to invest in Bulgarian firms active in the processing 
and preservation of foods, which will be then exported to the Asian market, which may 
be related to EU food and agricultural product standards and certification.
The main investors are Huawei, ZTE Corporation (telecommunication), Shanghai Video 
and Audio Electronics Group, Great Wall Motors, Tianjin State Farms Agribusiness 
Group and Insigma Technology, which operates desulfurisation facilities.
3. Conclusion 
While the majority of investors in central and eastern Europe have usually been 
motivated by relatively low labor and land costs, the well educated labor force necessary 
in manufacturing and access to rich EU markets, the authors of this chapter found 
that in the case of Chinese multinationals’ motives in central and eastern Europe – 
besides the aforementioned macroeconomic factors – a significant role is played by 
institutional factors and other less-quantifiable aspects, such as good political relations 
and diplomatic gestures. 
Chinese investments started to flow to central and eastern Europe after the countries 
of the region became EU member states. A significant increase in Chinese outward 
FDI occurred after the global financial crisis for two reasons: on one hand, the crisis 
adversely affected central and eastern European countries and most of them (not only 
the selected ones) started to seek new opportunities for recovery from the recession. 
For example, Hungary’s ‘Opening to the East’ policy was initiated after (and partly 
as a result of) the crisis, but the crisis also made other central and eastern European 
countries look eastward. On the other hand, despite the crisis China’s outward FDI 
continued to expand, not only to gain access to the necessary natural resources, but 
even more so for market seeking reasons in developed countries, not only in the core EU 
member states but also on the periphery. Another reason for this higher representation 
may be China’s diversification strategy; recent Chinese global investment strategy 
places great emphasis on diversification in all respects.
Investigation of the motivations of Chinese outward FDI in central and eastern 
Europe shows that they mostly seek markets in the region and CEE countries’ EU 
membership allows them to treat the region as a ‘back door’ or assembly base of 
products (greenfield) to be sold on the affluent EU markets (tariff-jumping FDI). 
Chinese investors are attracted by the relatively low labour costs, skilled workforce 
and market potential. It is characteristic that their investment pattern in terms of 
country location resembles that of total global FDI in the region. Chinese companies 
in central and eastern Europe are mainly private entities establishing greenfield 
production. However, there are also Chinese investors actively seeking technologies 
and distribution channels owned by local companies, which are cheaper than their 
EU15 or North American counterparts.
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Besides macroeconomic factors, when choosing a location in central and eastern 
Europe Chinese companies seem to be motivated by a number of institutional factors, 
such as the size and feedback of the Chinese ethnic minority, investment incentives 
and subsidies such as special economic zones, possibilities of acquiring visas and 
permanent residence permits (in exchange for a given level of investment), privatisation 
opportunities, the quality of political relations and the government’s willingness to 
cooperate. A clear example of this is Hungary’s good relations and very high level 
of Chinese FDI compared with other CEE countries, while it is said that Liu Gong’s 
acquisition of HSW in Poland might have been delayed because of China Overseas 
Engineering Group (COVEC)’s problems with building part of the Polish highway. 
The study does not touch upon the push factors of home country institutions that 
emerged recently and may enhance Chinese investments in the region. This is 
especially the case with regard to Poland becoming China’s strategic partner (at the end 
of 2011) and the establishment of the China-Central and Eastern Europe Cooperation 
Secretariat in September 2012. Also significant is that in 2010 the China Investment 
Promotion Agency (CIPA) opened its European office in Budapest.
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